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![]() The JavaScript loader was used to decode the registry key and retrieve the Cobalt Strike Beacon details. Decoding the registry key was possible using another equivalent JavaScript loader: js implementations by the REvil group were available that use the same technique and means of execution. As such, it did not appear to be decodable as-is. Unfortunately, the PowerShell code executed on the system contained undefined variables, such as pdqnas. ![]() The contents of the registry key were extracted for further analysis. The attack paths looked similar to the following: A path to Domain Admin was found via three “ Kerberoastable” accounts. The first hands-on-keyboard activity related to the threat actor was a BloodHound output file within the infected user’s profile directory, named _BloodHound zip, where was the time the data was captured.īlackBerry researchers retrieved a copy of the BloodHound output file and began enumerating attack paths that the threat actor may have abused. Instead, the group waited three days before connecting and beginning the initial enumeration. BloodHound and Kerberoastingįollowing the Gootkit installation, REvil didn’t immediately make use of the persistent access to this system. Threat intelligence was used to find similar code, but the exact code was unavailable. ![]() While the general layout of the loader was analyzed, BlackBerry was unable to obtain a copy of the exact JavaScript that would have been downloaded in this particular example of the final phase. Initially the JavaScript file contained obfuscated code within a variable labeled “ knew”: #Freefilesync google drive full
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